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Summary:  This article summarizes important aspects of illegal immigration. We analyse 
incentives of illegal immigrants as well as those of their employers by applying 
basic principles of labour economics, and by customising the workhorse of the 
economic theory of crime to suit the labour market for illegal immigrants. In 
addition, we describe the economic and social consequences of possible market 
outcomes.  
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The Demand for Illegal Migration and Market Outcomes 
 
Migration is a source of economic growth in many countries. The US, for instance, is growing 
more dependent on Mexican than on native-born labour. A large share of migrants have 
entered the US as ‘illegal or unauthorized immigrants’ by avoiding official inspection, passing 
through inspection with fraudulent documents, or by entering as a tourist and overstaying the 
term of their temporary visas. While it is extremely difficult to estimate the undocumented 
population, analysts place the figure at somewhere between 8 and 9 million in 2001, 
estimating growth of around 500,000 each year.1 Mexico remains the leading country of 
origin, being the source of nearly half of the total. Estimates for the number of illegal 
migrants living in Germany given without reference and explanation in publications of 
unions, parties, churches, and other official institutions vary between 500,000 and 1.5 million. 
Schneider (2003) estimates a number of 1.2 million illegal immigrants in Germany. Official 
and discretionary national policies reveal that illegal immigration is part of the nations’ labour 
demand. In particular the US practice of repeated amnesties to legalize unauthorized 
immigrants shows the demand of the booming US economy for labour, irrespective of 
whether it is legal or illegal. Germany has never declared any amnesties for illegal migrants, 
but nevertheless represents a second type of countries with high demand for illegal 
immigration, despite - or just because of - the rather recessionary situation of the German 
economy. As will be described in more detail in this article, among the most prominent 
reasons are high incentives of firms and private households to avoid and to circumvent 
pressures stemming from high labour costs, social security payments and taxation.  
 
Illegal labour markets are highly regulated. Of course, the regulation is quite different from 
some regulated legal European labour markets because of its clandestine and illegal nature. 
Notwithstanding this, tolerance towards illegal migration and the degree of regulation is 
dependent on time and location. Again, the US provides a good example. While the time-
dependency is obvious from the presence or absence of amnesties, country-specific regulation 
becomes evident from the different treatment of the Mexican and Canadian borders. 
According to MPI (2002), there are currently approximately 9,150 border patrol agents 
working along the 2,000-mile US-Mexico border, while there are only approximately 334 
agents working along the 4,000-mile US-Canada border. This example of asymmetry in 
                                                 
1 See MPI (2002). 
border enforcement shows that countries like the US would like to control the quantity of 
labour and the quality of labour skills in response to the prevailing economic and political 
situation. 
 
Summarizing problems associated with illegal migration, there are two main popular 
arguments. First, citizens of the home-country society may be concerned about an increasing 
number of crimes. Second, as motivated above, illegal immigrants could be attracted by 
(illegal) labour demand, enter national labour markets and push out native workers. In this 
article we are going to discuss the second issue2, while the problem of crime and immigration 
is discussed elsewhere.3 Especially, we will describe the incentives of national entrepreneurs 
as well as those of immigrants and summarize important results concerning the consequences 
of the demand for illegal immigrants. Gary Becker’s (1968) Nobel-prize winning theory 
explaining illegal individual behaviour will be used to understand the behaviour of 
participants of the market for illegal immigrant labour.4 Market outcomes and consequences 
in terms of costs and benefits of illegal migration are discussed in extra sections.  
 
 
Demand for illegal immigrant labour, migration decisions and market outcome  
 
Immigrants weigh up their chances and risks before entering a host-country to work illegally. 
We suppose people try to make the best of their opportunities and abilities. They take into 
account restrictions caused by markets, institutions, and other individuals. The most important 
incentive to work abroad is a boost in personal income. The expected income of an illegal 
immigrant is uncertain because a possible apprehension and deportation by both the home- 
and host-country authorities is accompanied by a loss in real or potential earnings. The 
migration decision depends on the difference between the expected gain from the uncertain 
income in the host-country and the relatively fixed income in the source country. In contrast 
to legal migrants, illegal migrants need to take into account the probability of being detected 
and the severity of some potential penalty. Information on such figures can be gathered from 
public media and from homecomers who are asked how successful or painful the work abroad 
                                                 
2 We do not consider problems associated with demand in the sense of ‘pull factors’, e.g. due to achievements of 
the welfare state, see, for instance, Meyer (2003). 
3 See Entorf and Larsen (2004) 
4 Earlier examples are given by Ethier and Entorf who formalized the market of illegal migrants. Ethier 
investigates the impact of different deterrence instruments in a general equilibrium framework, while Entorf 
studies the behavior of illegal immigrants and policy implications in a partial model. 
was. Gathering information means nothing else than estimating the detection probability, 
possible penalties, and the attainable wages in the host-country.  
 
Explaining the behaviour of entrepreneurs in the host-country is possible via the same 
maximizing scheme. Wages for illegal workers are costs for the entrepreneur – without giving 
the state its piece of the cake. Furthermore, no job protection exists for clandestine workers. 
Hence, the entrepreneur has the opportunity to hire and fire in correspondence with current 
demand. In a ceteris paribus analysis where we fix product price, marketable amount and 
quality of a product, as well as the amount of input factors, the maximization of earnings is 
identical to minimization of the input price, i.e. minimizing wages. All these assumptions are 
especially reasonable in markets for “low-skilled” products where education and experience 
of workers are less important. However, if an entrepreneur employs illegal immigrants he 
faces some additional expected costs due to the risk of being detected and punished. The 
probability of being detected and the sentence in the case of detection determine the demand 
for illegal workers in a company. 
 
Thus, both entrepreneurs and illegal immigrants are deterred by a high detection probability 
and hard fines which can both be controlled by national governments. Frequent authorization 
checks, for instance, make hiring illegal workers a risky buisness, and increasing sanctions for 
employers reduces the incentive to employ foreigners without work permits. As a 
consequence, the demand for illegal labour would decrease at given wages or, if illegal labour 
supply is rigid, “profitable” wages of illegal workers would drop, such that potential income 
opportunities from illegal migration would fall.  
 
Other measures such as increasing minimum wages might lead to higher demand for illegal 
immigrant labour, because higher minimum wages increase the pressure on employers to hire 
illegal immigrants. Labour market policy, therefore, might have some unintended influence 
on the number of illegal immigrants. In many EU-countries the strong influence of trade 
unions has led to a rise in minimum wages. In a highly competitive economic environment, 
higher wages increase the incentive to hire illegal migrants and dismiss low-educated native 
workers. However, as low-skilled employees (and not low-skilled unemployed) represent 
typical union members, an increasing size of the illegal workforce might negatively affect the 
coverage rate of unions. Foreigners will become union members only if they are part of the 
official workforce. Thus, the raise in the minimum wage could be counter-productive not only 
for the number of profitable jobs but also for unions themselves. 
 
In Figure 1 arguments listed above are illustrated using the basic tools of economists and 
employing Becker’s arguments of deterrence. Entrepreneurs’ demand curve dd for illegal 
immigrant labour (which includes the demand provided by private households) is downward 
sloping, i.e. demand increases when the wage (wage costs for entrepreneurs), π , of illegal 
labour decreases. The supply curve ss symbolizes the manpower offered by immigrants. p 
represents the probability of detection and f the severity of sanction. If one or both of these 
policy variables are scaled up then employment of illegal workers is becoming more costly 
and thus less attractive to employers.5 This is shown by a shift of the demand curve resulting 
in the curve d’d’. This shift comes along with a lower wage π* for illegal workers and a 
smaller number q* of them in the labour market.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The market for illegal migration 
 
Parameters p and f, set by immigration policy, change the maximization calculus of a risk 
neutral entrepreneur. If supply curves both of illegal immigrants and demand curves of 
                                                 
5 In 2002 and 2003, the German government adopted some laws to stem the shadow economy (see “Drucksache 
15/726“ of “Deutscher Bundestag“). In accordance with our model they have done this by increasing fines, by 
employing more officers, and some further measures. We could interpret the increasing number of officers who 
control persons on the job and employers as a measure to increase detection probability. 
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national entrepreneurs are elastic then the burden of fines are shared by both groups. 
Introducing fines on employers also reduces profits from illegal work for immigrants. They 
are afraid of apprehension and loss of their wages. Thus, similar to the shift of the demand 
curve, supply of illegal migrants might be curbed by stronger controls or sanctions, such that 
equilibrium wages paid to illegal migrants might go up again. In Figure 1, however, we 
assume that the supply side is rather unaffected by measures of deterrence (as confirmed by 
the US-Mexican experience).  
 
 
Consequences and cost-benefit considerations 
 
Both the national entrepreneur and immigrants benefit from the income differential between 
home and host-countries. If entrepreneurs are risk neutral and maximize their expected 
income then we should expect a high percentage of illegal immigrants in the EU workforce. 
Since illegal immigrants are always clandestine workers, taxes as well as payments to the 
social security system could be retained by the employers. The estimation of the damage 
caused by illegal work is a difficult task. Experts agree that illegal work is gaining in 
importance. During the last 15 years, the size of the shadow economy has increased relative to 
the national income in most European EU countries. The percentage of the shadow economy 
is within the range of 9.5 percent for Switzerland and 28.3 for Greece (see Schneider for all 
numbers quoted2). The most important EU-countries have the following quotas: Germany 
16.8 percent, France 14.8 percent, and Great Britain 12.3 percent. In Germany there were 9.42 
million illegal native workers and 1.225 million illegal immigrants in 2003, whereas these 
numbers were 7.32 million and 0.878 million in 1995. Of course, such numbers are pure 
guess-estimates and are based on full-time equivalents of estimated working hours which in 
turn were calculated from figures of illegal production.6 If Schneider’s estimate are correct, 
then demand for illegal immigrants goes along with the rise in demand for illegal native 
workers. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the number of illegal immigrants is more 
demand driven then determined by the supply side, i.e. conditions in countries of origin. 
Otherwise, we should have seen a displacement of illegal native wokers by illegal immigrants. 
                                                 
6 All figures are based on the currency demand approach. Schneider calculates current figures. Schneider and 
Enste (2000), p.81, presents a long-run perspective on a smaller sample. 
Thus, we argue that factors which increase the informal economy likewise increase the flow 
of illegal immigration.7 
 
When evaluating the consequences of immigration on the economy it is often distinguished 
between skilled and unskilled labour. As high-skilled immigrants typically are legal 
immigrants we omit this discussion here. Illegal immigrants typically are unskilled and 
compete with unskilled native workers. It is estimated that with a low unemployment rate the 
impact of immigrants is modest. This result can change in the presence of a high 
unemployment rate. Following Zimmermann (1998), the loss in GNP in the presence of an 
undamped laissez-faire immigration policy could be up to five percent.8 In a recent paper, 
Angrist and Kugler (2003) also found a strong negative impact on the unemployment rate if 
the share of immigrants in the EU increases.  
 
Illegal immigration could have positive effects on the wealth of nations. In addition to the 
argument backed by US experience that illegal migration might fill the gap of significant 
labour shortages in booming economies, it could be argued that illegal immigrants are 
substitutes for low-skilled workers and complements for high-skilled workers.9 In the short-
run we could also expect that employment of illegal immigrants is a mechanism to erode 
inefficient regulation and bureaucracy. Moreover, a high number of foreigners in a host-
country could increase cultural diversity. In the long-run we could expect a positive effect on 
foreign trade because of well settled cultural and ethnic channels between receiving and 
sending countries. After all, the impact of illegal immigrants crucially depends on the 
unemployment rate as well as on the behaviour of unemployed natives. Results of empirical 
studies estimating the effect of legal and illegal immigration in Europe are rather mixed.10 
 
Our previous discussion is based on economic arguments. However, social costs are likewise 
important. In European countries with dominant labour migration citizens have rather 
negative sentiments towards immigrants, in contrast to the situation in traditional countries of 
migration (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and USA) where most immigrants are selected 
according to education and skill needs (with the exception of the US). In particular, low-
educated employees who compete with immigrants for scarce jobs tend to have strong 
                                                 
7 A comprehensive survey is given in Schneider and Enste (2000), Section 3 (‘The Main Causes of the 
Increase’). 
8 Similar figures are calculated by Borjas (2003) for the US labor market.  
9 See Zimmermann (1998) as well as Del Boca and Venturini (2003) for the situation in Italy.  
10 See Zimmermann (1995). 
negative sentiments.11 Thus, employment of illegal immigrants might cause xenophobic 
movements which could hinder the integration of legal immigrants and thus finally lead to 
high economic as well as to intangible costs. 
 
                                                 
11 See Bauer, Lofstom, Zimmermann (2000). Similar are results for the United States, see Scheve and Slaughter 
(2001). 
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